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Abstract 
The presence of rationing of financial services in the developing countries is a major obstacle 
to achieving sustainable growth. In recent years there have been co-ordinated efforts to 
increase the level of financial inclusion, i.e. to reduce the supply-side constraints restricting 
access to finance. This paper aims to understand household’s latent behaviour decision 
making in accessing financial services, by analysing an entry level Mzansi account in South 
Africa. The willingness to access financial services is not taken as given, but it is instead 
defined by perceptions and attitudes. The Mzansi intervention is appealing to individuals with 
basic but insufficient financial education. Aspirations seem to be very influential in revealing 
the choice of financial services and to this end, Mzansi is perceived as a pre-entry account not 
meeting the aspirations of individuals aiming to climb up the financial services ladder.  
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Introduction 
The issues of financial and economic development have been a focus of substantial 
theoretical and empirical literature. Although there is some controversy over the direction of 
causality in the finance-growth relationship, financial systems are important for facilitating 
and maintaining economic growth. Furthermore, financial development is generally accepted 
to exert beneficial effects not only on growth but also in terms of poverty alleviation (see e.g. 
Beck et al., 2009). The latter further emphasises the importance of finance in relation to 
development, particularly when the very nature and functions of financial systems existing in 
Western economies and implicitly embedded in existing theoretical models become an 
inadmissible assumption. Traditionally empirical studies investigating the financial 
development relationship to growth have focused on financial depth. This fact conforms to an 
implicit assumption of universality and to some extent, uniformity of financial systems in 
terms of their functions. Focusing on financial depth essentially assumes all financial systems 
work in the same way (i.e. possess the same functions) and the overall (growth inducing) 
impact is simply a measure of magnitude, a magnitude that can be directly related to a 
measure of the development of the relevant financial systems. More recently analytical 
attention has turned to the issues of financial outreach and inclusion; something often referred 
to as access to finance. This is an important conceptual shift with far-reaching consequences.  
The lack of access to finance in developing economies could, nevertheless, be an equilibrium 
outcome resulting from imperfect market competition. In terms of credit provision, the 
relevant theoretical models are the ones explaining credit rationing. The implicit assumption 
of credit to a source for expansion of economic activity and therefore, growth has, to some 
extent, biased analytical attention towards credit, but many of the underlying arguments in 
such models can be readily extended to provision of other financial services.  Such a one-
sided focus in the theoretical literature is, nevertheless, understandable bearing in mind that 
credit has important consumption smoothing function (and hence can lead to better outcomes 
in a dynamic context).  
In the access to finance discourse, we are concerned with “type 2” rationing in the sense of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) where some applicants are refused loans altogether despite their 
willingness to pay the market rate of interest. There are two defining characteristics of this 
theoretical reasoning that transpire in most empirical studies related to access to finance. The 
first relates to that the (latent) demand for credit (or general financial services) is taken for 
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given. The other, which to some degree follows from the former, is the focus at the supply 
side.  
Let us briefly review the type two credit rationing. There are two main sources of this type of 
rationing, namely hidden action and hidden (project) type. Hidden action means that the 
effort to ascertain the project risk is either too costly, or the project risks itself is non-
verifiable. The former entails the classical transaction cost argument: banks incur similar 
screening costs, and thus they will prefer lending larger credits. In such cases, a credit 
rationing equilibrium may arise, because any increases in the loans create moral hazard 
effects (in the case of hidden action) and adverse selection (in the case of hidden type). At a 
macro-economic level, these negative effects dominate the effect on the interest rate change 
and by reducing the profitability of the banks make it impossible for them to attract sufficient 
finance via deposits. Note that from lenders’ point of view, the hidden action problem arises 
because there is not sufficient information about the potential clients. Therefore, the lack of 
studies about the potential demand contributes to this exclusion, since it prevents lenders 
from ascertaining the nature of the demand and thus the lack of such information creates a 
hidden action problem. Of course, research on the determinants of the latent demand for 
financial services in its own cannot eliminate the problem since the transaction cost argument 
will still hold.  
Bester (1985) showed that in hidden types model by posting collateral borrowers can achieve 
a separating equilibrium with no credit rationing. The extent to which this can be achieved, 
depends, of course, on the relative availability of collateral. Whenever the net worth of such 
is low, this separation may still be unachievable (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Given that in a 
typical type of cases of lacking access to finance one is likely to consider in a developing 
country, the availability of any type of collateral has to be excluded from the very outset, why 
do we even invoke such an argument? Note, however, that the same line of reasoning could 
be applied to any form of ‘third party collateral’ i.e. when a third party provides collateral 
that eliminates the hidden type of problem. If one assumes that the demand is present, it 
would be logical for the lenders to jointly provide such ‘third party collateral’ in expanding 
the provision of financial services. Such an intervention could be beneficial for the lenders if 
the suppressed demand is existing in that the individual risks faced by lenders will essentially 
be pooled together into a common insurance-like pool, and the aggregate benefits would 
exceed the individual lenders’ costs. It is, nevertheless, important to stress that if the latent 
demand that we just assumed is not there, or it is not as strong as assumed, the above logic 
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breaks down. Therefore, studies of this demand are also necessary if a coordinated 
intervention designed to overcome the hidden type problem is being considered. 
Implementing such a coordinated intervention could prove unsustainable whenever this latent 
demand is weak. Nevertheless, there is another theoretical argument in favor of such an 
intervention. As De Meza and Webb (2006) show credit rationing implies an infinite 
marginal cost of credit to the borrower. A stylised fact of the poor in a development context, 
however, is their high-risk aversion. Under high and extreme risk aversion, the marginal cost 
of credit will reduce, which says that in such circumstances, the existence of demand 
becomes very suspect. One could nonetheless, hypothesise that one of the drivers for such 
high-risk  aversion is the exclusion from formal financial services itself, which forces poor 
households to avail to alternative risk coping strategies. This suggests that introducing 
coordinate intervention can by providing access to financial services reduce risk aversion and 
therefore, via increased marginal cost (for these) ultimately create demand. This solicits 
studying demand under such interventions.  
The strategies, from a client point of view, to eliminate rationing discussed in the theoretical 
models include reducing the size of the project, postponing its start and saving (to self finance 
larger part of the project). Reducing the size of the project assumes it is divisible, which may 
or may not be the case. Since most ‘projects’ involving poor ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ would be 
rather small, size reduction will have limited scope. Postponement, on the other hand, will 
only work if it does not have been deteriorating effects on the projects net value. Note that 
one may combine these strategies, and such combinations may overcome the credit rationing 
problem. We will argue that whenever characteristics that facilitate the above strategies, such 
as e.g. propensity to save and interest in longer-term financial planning are present within the 
poor, these indicate the presence of latent demand.  
The general implication of the Stiglitz-Weiss model is that if banks have a way to distinguish 
between different classes of risk, rationing will reduce and disappear. The theoretical 
suggestions of how to reduce and eliminate credit rationing (e.g. Bester, 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Chan and Thakor, 1987; Parker, 2000; Lensink and Sterken, 2002) are 
essentially proposing different means to achieve this. Note, however, that the informal market 
can be typically viewed as a substitute for not well functioning formal markets (in the 
presence of rationing) and hence should incorporate some of these rationing avoidance 
means. Note, for example, that informal markets are highly segmented. The conventional 
wisdom views this as a way to prevent arbitrage possibilities (and hence an imperfection).  
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Imposing segmentation can, however, also be seen as a type of discrimination among 
different types of clients, which achieves a separating equilibrium under conditions of initial 
rationing. In simple words, the credit rationing is a type of pooling equilibrium, where all 
clients get the same conditions), while separating equilibria provide means for distinguishing 
different clients. Whether the latter arises from a clients’ actions (such as providing extra 
collateral or savings) or by a supply-side initiative (such as intentional market segmentation), 
the outcome is qualitatively the same. 
The implicit assumption of the barriers to financial services argument is on the supply-side 
constraint. This is either because one may not be able to directly observe the latent demand 
for financial products whenever the supply constraints are in place or because “those who 
have access but choose not to use services pose less of a problem for policymakers” (Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008). Relaxing the supply-side barriers would, however, bring the 
potential lack of demand for financial services to the forefront with important policy 
implications. After all coordinated policy interventions designed to expand access to finance 
is costly and such costs will need to be compared to the potential benefits. When the barriers 
to access are removed, voluntary non-participation reduces these benefits. Hence studying the 
determinants of demand for financial services becomes an important research question. In 
this type of analysis the important question becomes whether exclusion from financial 
services is voluntary or involuntary.  It is clearly infeasible to try to carry out reliable 
distinction between these two forms of exclusion in the presence of binding barriers 
established at the supply side. There are, however, two cases where such investigations could 
be conducted. One is when individuals are transferred into a different environment where 
such barriers are not implemented. For example, Osili and Paulson (2008) examined the 
determinants of financial market participation among immigrants in the USA and found that 
institutional factors have profound effects. They hypothesised that the main channel through 
which these institutional factors affect market participation are beliefs. Beliefs, however, are 
difficult to measure and in a more general, framework can be represented by alternative 
indicators such as values, attitudes, perceptions and levels of financial literacy. We argue that 
these have to be considered when evaluating the potential effect of expanding access to 
finance. The uptake of new financial services bridging over existing barriers will define who 
will benefit the expanded access to finance.  
Investigations such as this of Osili and Paulson (2008) are important in that they open a 
totally new research agenda and allow characterisation of voluntary participation in accessing 
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financial services. Transplanting individuals from one environment to a totally different one 
may tell us a lot about attitudes and culture, but it does not sufficiently well capture the 
institutional framework established in their home country.  It would be much more useful if 
the decision to avail to different forms of financial services could be investigated in a more 
natural environment, i.e. in a developing country context.  This is where the second case in 
which such investigation could be conducted arises. Studying such financial choices in the 
latter case could be very useful in better characterising what defines financial behaviour and 
due to the natural setting of such a study, it can provide even more useful guides for future 
policy interventions.  
This paper takes a preliminary step in this research quest considering the case of the Mzansi 
intervention in South Africa. The Mzansi intervention represents a coordinated roll-out of 
financial services in targeting the poor and vulnerable. Rarely, is the experience of such an 
intervention that draws on a linkage between private commercial banks and either state-
owned banks or an act of legislation to expand financial access. Furthermore, the co-
ordinated and wide–ranging scope of the Mzansi intervention provides an opportunity to 
study the individual financial choice in a developing context without the presence of binding 
supply side restrictions. 
Kostov et al. (2012, 2014a, 2014b) produce some results on this relationship using a range of 
variable selection methods, but unlike the present paper fail to provide a coherent theoretical 
model underlying their application. Furthermore we take into account possible 
methodological pitfalls in these previous aplications. 
Background 
Until the end to the apartheid era in 1994, financial services in South Africa were 
predominantly accessible to the non-black community and therefore, by default excluded the 
economically weaker households (Meagher and Wilkinson 2006). In South Africa, the 
‘Mzansi’ account intervention offers a peculiar case in which commercial banks, and a state-
owned financial institution take a lead role to expand access to financial services. Finmark 
Trust (2009) cautions that although significant successful indicators are identifiable with the 
‘Mzansi’ account intervention replicating this strategy require similar country level socio-
economic and financial landscape characteristics. Furthermore, the evidence of 1.6 million 
accounts classified as dormant within the first four years after the Mzansi account operation 
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underscores the importance of circumspection and identification of  the drivers and 
perceptions of household’s decision to open and maintain an account.  
Following the Financial Service Charter (FSC) policy recommendations the ‘Mzansi’ account 
which was initiated in 2004 offered entry-level accounts.  The intervention was situated in the 
broader context of financial services outreach that is scale (i.e. number of clients), depth (i.e. 
poorer clients), scope (i.e. wide range of services) and breadth (i.e. reaching different social 
groups). Operating under the broader government policy framework of economically 
empowering the black community in South Africa, the FSC aimed at providing effective 
access to transaction and savings financial services. While the initiative was not legally 
backing, consenting financial institutions, through some form of social contract were 
committed to expanding access and providing affordable financial services to the wider 
population. Beyond national goals, participating institutions, four main private banks in South 
Africa (Absa, Nedbank, First National and Standard) and a state-owned financial institution 
(Postbank) was motivated based upon a consensus of shared reputational and financial risk.  
In terms of depth of outreach, the specific target of the issuing institutions was that 80% of 
the poorest households, defined as the fifth segment of the South African living standard 
population, should have effective access to transaction and savings products and services. We 
investigate a demand side concern - household inherent motivation in choosing a financial 
service.  In particular, their financial education background (how financially literate they are), 
opinions on their financial needs, aspirations and attitudes. Our central research question is - 
in what way does these hidden factors (education, perception and attitudes) affect the uptake 
of Mzansi account? 
 
Mzansi’s access to finance framework 
Classens (2006) identifies four pre-requisites for improved access to financial services, 
namely; availability, reliability, flexibility and continuity of access to financial services.  Two 
of the four requirements that are availability, and reliability can be identified with the 
‘Mzansi’ account initiative. Firstly, the worth and reputation of the four commercial banks 
coupled with the credibility of the state bank naturally invokes confidence of sustainability 
and non-exploitation in potential clients. Secondly, the widespread coverage of all the issuing 
institutions, especially Postbank, presents potential clients with proximity of a financial 
service point of transaction either physically or electronically. Broadly speaking the overall 
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aims of the Mzansi intervention seems to have been reached, although the financial 
sustainability of the scheme and therefore, its attractiveness to banks could be questioned 
(Finmark Trust, 2009). Initial evaluations of the Mzansi intervention have focused on directly 
inquiring clients about their opinion and attitudes. The mode of elicitation of their motivation, 
however, could condition their stated opinion. To better understand what truly makes a 
customer go for a Mzansi account; it is preferable to investigate the choice of Mzansi 
conditional on their background. Conventional financial wisdom would dictate that the 
relevant background variables are those measuring who they are. When access to financial 
services is concerned, these include their financial literacy, i.e. the elements of their financial 
‘education’ and understanding of financial concepts. These will differentiate the actual from 
the stated scope of the Mzansi intervention. Note, however, that simple comparison to the 
distribution of these characteristics between holders and non-holders can to a large extent 
capture this. The internal motivation of clients could, however, be measured by their general 
attitude towards financial literacy, namely what they think is missing from their financial 
understanding and what they want to learn. Providing characterisation of the Mzansi choice 
based on these internal motivations would not simply complement the ‘who they are’ 
characterisation, but would also describe in some more detail the realised scope of the Mzansi 
intervention.  Therefore, such an analysis would contribute towards a better fine-tuning of the 
actual scope of Mzansi, so that it better reflects the needs of its customers. This could have 
twofold benefits. First it could go some way in addressing the issue of high share of inactive 
Mzansi accounts. Second it would undoubtedly help banks better target their clients by better 
differentiating Mzansi from their entry level products and hence contribute to achieve a 
longer-term sustainability of the scheme. We have briefly discussed the issues of financial 
rationing in the preceding sections. Instead of seeking means to obtain information about the 
clients as in all separating equilibria, Mzansi intervention tries to avoid rationing in a totally 
different way. It still pools together clients, hoping that the benefits from incorporating 
‘good’ clients will outweigh the disadvantages of including the ‘bad’ ones. Hence the Mzansi 
approach aims at pooling equilibrium, rather than a separating one, as in e.g. micro-finance 
and informal finance channels. In a dynamic view, providing basic services widening 
participation in financial markets could be advantageous in providing further information that 
banks can use to achieve separating equilibria (i.e. to distinguish well with bad clients). The 
other potential advantage of such a scheme is the potential reduction of demand-side 
rationing. Long-term credit rationing on the supply side can, however, lead to learning effect 
inducing demand-side rationing. See, for example, Kon and Story’s (2003) theory of the 
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discouraged borrowers. Hence the presence of supply side rationing creates transaction costs 
(e.g. borrowers know that it will be costly and probably unsuccessful to apply to the formal 
sector and can directly approach informal lenders). In this way supply side rationing leads to 
demand depression (or re-allocation to the informal sector) and increased risk aversion, 
which further reduces demand. Mzansi is supposed to eliminate this demand depression and 
hence could be expected to have dynamic learning effects. In this particular study, due to its 
preliminary and exploratory nature we will ignore such dynamic effects, but one needs to be 
aware of them. 
Data 
The empirical section of the paper relies on the 2007 Finscope South Africa dataset. Finmark 
Trust launched Finscope in 2003 in an attempt to establish credible benchmarks for the use 
of, and access to, financial services in South Africa. The aim was to achieve a measure and 
understanding of consumer demand across transactions, savings, credit and insurance 
categories. The sample frame of the Finscope data consists of all South Africans aged 16 
years and above. The nationally representative data is based on enumeration areas and 
stratified multistage sampling technique. The 2007 Finscope dataset was collected from 3900 
households using face to face interviews from April to May 2007. The scope of the data was 
categorized under two broad headings namely, living standard and financial services. The 
former captures issues such as income, quality of life, and household demographics, while the 
latter tracks national financial access patterns and pathways in terms of products and service 
providers and household financial decision trees and perceptions.  
In this analysis, we use 102 variables, grouped in the following categories: basic literacy, 
understanding financial terms, targets for financial advice, financial education desired and 
financial perception. The full listing of employed variables and their exact definitions are 
available upon request.  
Here we will only briefly describe these categories. Basic literacy contains a single indicator 
variable. The understanding of financial terms category includes 17 variables that quantify 
whether the respondents comprehend the actual meaning of a number of financial terms, 
ranging from simple ones such as bad debt and loan to increasingly more complex ones such 
as pieces of financial legislation. One could hypothesise that clients would need some basic 
financial understanding in order to select themselves into the Mzansi intervention, but having 
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better understanding would mean that they would not be satisfied with the basic features 
offered by Mzansi and would require more sophisticated products. 
The target for financial advice category includes 15 variables asking whether the respondents 
would use certain sources in order to obtain financial advice. The sources range from 
informal ones (such as family and friends) to formal professional type of advice providers 
(such as financial institutions and independent brokers). Furthermore, some of the sources 
could be formulated in such a way that respondents may not properly understand them and/or 
different types of advice sources could be bundled into the same category (e.g. “A financial 
advisor other than an independent broker (e.g. tax consultant, auditor)”). 
Further 16 variables describe what type of financial education respondents desires. These 
variables imply the respondents do not possess this form of financial education. Most 
importantly, however, they measure their intrinsic aspirations to further themselves. People 
aspiring to obtain further financial education could aspire to move up the financial access 
ladder. Therefore, even if their background (financial education) places them on a particular 
step in this ladder, their aspirations can provide additional motivation, and hence they may be 
motivated to move up. In this way, they may end up at a higher step, simply because this is 
where they (aspire to) belong. Hence this category measure and quantifies the inherent 
motivations of banking clients. With respect to Mzansi, which is essentially a pre-entry level 
account, one could hypothesise that most types of expressed desire to obtain further financial 
education would move clients up towards the banks’ entry level accounts and hence have a 
negative impact on Mzansi uptake. 
Finally, we have two categories of financial perceptions variables. These ask people, whether 
they agree with some statements. In this way, the internal motivations and perceptions 
towards financial behaviour are evaluated. The financial perceptions grid 1 variables ask 
factual questions about actual behaviour, while grid 2 variables refer mostly to attitudes 
(opinion, trust, etc.). Thus, the two categories of financial perception complement each other 
by measuring two facets of the same phenomenon. 
 
Methodology 
Since our dataset consist entirely of factor variables, a binary dependent variable type of 
model is a natural choice within the modelling framework. In particular, the logistic 
regression is a common choice for modelling framework in such situations. For variable 
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selection, we have used a penalised regression approach. Previous analysis of this issue used 
the Dantzig selector (Kostov et al., 2012), the adaptive lasso method and a range of other 
frequentist and Bayesian regularisation methods (Kostov et al, 2014b) and considered the 
uncertainty in the variable selection procedures (Kostov et al, 2014a).  There is however an 
important methodological issue that needs to be taken into account. When there are groups of 
highly correlated variables, something that is not unusual is empirical studies, most penalised 
approaches tend to (arbitrarily) select only one variable from each group. This makes the 
resulting models difficult to interpret, since variables that are strongly associated with the 
outcome may not be included into the model simply because they are also strongly correlated 
with a variable that is included. This kind of difficulty can be illustrated e.g. by the results 
from alternative estimators, presented in Kostov et al., 2014b) where different methods seem 
to select different variables from each of the underlying categories.  While in some cases  
since in many datasets such as in the present ones multiple variables can be viewed as proxies 
for a number of underlying latent factors, different methods selecting different variables from 
the same categories may not impact substantially on the interpretation of the result, this is by 
no means guaranteed. Furthermore the latter will only occur if these categories (employed in 
the results interpretation) have been correctly identified. The latter assumes some pre-existing 
knowledge about the structure of the analytical problem, which in many ways goes against 
the general logic of a variable selection methods generally designed for structure discovery. It 
is therefore of paramount importance to account for this underlying correlation structure and 
in such way to immunise empirical findings against the above undesirable property of 
regularisation variable selection methods. 
The group-wise least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) can deal with 
groups of correlated variables, but it requires that the relevant group are pre-specified. 
Bondell and Reich (2008) proposed the OSCAR (octagonal shrinkage and clustering 
algorithm for regression) approach that performs variable selection for regressions with 
highly correlated predictors.  
The OSCAR estimator can be formally defined as: 
 ( ) ( ) { }1 2 1 2
1
, arg min max ,
p
j j k
j j kβ
β λ λ β λ β λ β β
= <
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Where ( )β  is the corresponding loss function (in this case the negative log-likelihood for 
the logistic regression model), p is the number of parameters (to be estimated), while 1λ and 
2λ  are non-negative penalty parameters (to be tuned).   
The OSCAR method can simultaneously perform variable selection and cluster the important 
variables. It achieves this by employing a weighted combination of L1 (absolute deviations) 
penalty term 
1
p
j
j
β
=
∑  and a pair wise L∞ (i.e. maximum) penalty { }max ,j k
j k
β β
<
∑ for the 
coefficients. The L1 penalty effectively shrinks the coefficients towards zero, hence 
introducing sparsity and by eliminating unimportant variables performs variable selection. 
The pairwise L∞ penalty, on the other hand, has the effect of encouraging equality of 
coefficients by penalising large differences between coefficients. Hence the OSCAR 
approach eliminates unimportant variables, but also groups the important ones in clusters 
with similar coefficients.   
If we set 2λ =0 the OSCAR estimator reduces to the LASSO which produces sparse estimates 
but no clustering. The effect of the latter, as discussed above, is that whenever there are 
groups of highly correlated variables, the algorithm will tend to select one variable from each 
such group.  With 2λ >0, the grouping effect keeps correlated variables together. Note also 
that with 2
1
λ
λ
→∞ , the grouping effect will prevail resulting in clustering with no variable 
selection. The exact values to the penalty parameters, which can be chosen by cross-
validation, define the nature of the estimator. The theoretical results for any regularisation 
estimator are established with regard to the optimal amount of shrinkage (i.e. in this case the 
optimal values of 1λ  and 2λ ). Employing cross-validation (or any other method) to select 
these parameters is, however, very demanding from computational point of view, since it will 
require multiple evaluation of the objective function. This computational cost can greatly 
reduce the appeal of such method. It is therefore, if methods that circumvent this are 
available. In particular, for the introduction of the LARS (least angle regression) algorithm of 
Efron et al. (2004) have revolutionised regularisation approaches. Efron et al. (2004) have 
shown that the whole regularisation path for the LASSO is piecewise linear and the LARS 
algorithm can compute it for a range of shrinkage values at the computational cost of a single 
least squares fitting. This has lead into a search for similar fast regularisation path algorithms. 
Once such an algorithm is available the repeated optimisations of the underlying problem are 
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no longer needed. This allows the implementation of cross validation to choose the 
appropriate shrinkage parameters. Regularisation path algorithms are even more valuable 
when there is more than one shrinkage parameter (as in OSCAR). In this paper, we 
implement the Local Quadratic Approximation (LQA) algorithm of Fan and Li (2001) with 
an OSCAR penalty and use 5-fold cross validation to choose the amount of shrinkage in both 
directions (i.e. the combination of penalty parameters ( 1λ , 2λ )). The LQA algorithm is not as 
computationally efficient as the LARS one, but has the added flexibility that it is universally 
applicable. While the LARS algorithm is strictly speaking only applicable to a LASSO type 
problems in linear models, it is possible to modify the LQA algorithm (which was initially 
introduced to deal with the SCAD penalty) to a wide variety of alternative penalty terms and 
models. In this case, we have a logistic regression (generalised linear model) with a 
composite (OSCAR) penalty. 
 
Results 
The LQA provides us with the regularisation path for the OSCAR estimator of the logistic 
regression of the choice of Mzansi account on the set of 102 variables, described under the 
data section for a range of different regularisation parameters. A five-fold cross-validation is 
then applied to the output of the LQA algorithm, and the optimal amount of shrinkage is 
selected thus producing the final estimated model. The latter is summarised in Table 1, which 
presents the selected independent variables (i.e. the variables with non-zero coefficients) and 
their estimated coefficients. 
Out of the 102 candidate variables, only 15 are retained in the estimated model. Here we 
briefly summarise the results.  Before we do so however, note the following details about the 
results interpretation. As already discussed since our variables are basically indicators, they 
are expressed in the same units which mean the estimated coefficients are naturally 
‘standardised’. I addition to allowing for direct application of the OSCAR algorithm this also 
facilitates results discussion about the sense that we can directly compare different 
coefficients in terms of their magnitude. In this case, the strength of the relative effects will 
be directly proportional to the estimated coefficients. In some cases, however, the fact that 
given variable is not included in the final model (i.e. the lack of impacts) could be an 
interesting and meaningful result in itself and could deserve attention. Additionally, for ease 
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of interpretation we apply boldface formatting to the negative coefficients, making it easier to 
distinguish them from the positive ones. Let us now proceed with the results. 
Insert Table 1 
First, the basic literacy variable does not discriminate between Mzansi account holders and 
non-holders. Since basic literacy can be expected to be a pre-requisite to any form of access 
to finance, it could be expected to discriminate between individuals with and without such 
access. Note, however, that since the individuals without Mzansi comprise of both people 
lacking access and people who use better than the basic Mzansi access, such a variable cannot 
differentiate Mzansi holders from the rest. 
Next, two variables from the “understanding of financial terms” categories are retained. 
These are Bad debt and Garnishee order or emolument order. Bearing in mind that this 
category has an almost natural hierarchy from simpler to more complex terms, the selected 
terms lie towards the lower end of this hierarchy. Therefore, the individuals selecting 
themselves into the Mzansi system only possess some understanding of basic financial terms, 
i.e. have a minimal financial education. They need such basic understanding in order to be 
motivated to seek access to finance. Had however, they possessed better financial knowledge; 
they would have opted for more advanced forms of access, from the basic entry accounts 
upwards.  
Only two of the variables in the category “targets for financial advice” are selected. Since the 
sample also contains individuals with no financial access and such with enhanced (compared 
to Mzansi) access to finance, the model finds it difficult to explicitly differentiate between 
differences that could be attributable to these two alternative categories. A major reason for 
this is the fact that in contrast to the “understanding of financial terms” category, here it is 
difficult to find similar natural hierarchy, which means that the differentiation of the choice 
of Mzansi from below (i.e. against no access) and above (i.e. better access) is pooled 
together. The latter was not a problem with the previous category due to the natural 
hierarchy, but in terms of the sources of financial advice, the lack of such confuses matters. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the wording of the options within this category could be 
confusing for respondents. The selected variables are Independent broker and a financial 
advisor other than an independent broker. Hence the Mzansi holders seek generally 
independent financial advice. This excludes family members and friends, as well as the 
providers of financial services. One could assume that these (unselected) sources of financial 
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advice are seen as being more partial. Additionally, the existing basic financial understanding 
pushes then to seek some independence in making financial decisions. Their financial literacy 
being just that, basic, however, means that they do not feel sufficiently confident in judging 
for themselves advice that can be seen as being somewhat biased, and therefore, they prefer a 
truly independent opinion. The coefficient for independent broker is by far the largest of any 
explanatory variable. Given that we interpret this variable also in the sense that some kind of 
impartial financial advice is sought, this may look slightly out of line. Remember that the 
OSCAR algorithm implicitly groups correlated variables and force the coefficient in the same 
group to converge. This obviously has not happened here, which means that the two variables 
in this category are not highly correlated. One reason for this could be that there might be a 
scope of interpretation of what the latter variable actually means. In this sense such as 
elicitation effects could be translated into different underlying meaning for different types of 
respondents.  If we take into account that in the actual spelling of the underlying question 
terms such as tax consultant and auditor are mentioned as examples, it may appear strange 
that this variable was selected, and that it increases (rather than decreasing) the likelihood of 
opting into the Mzansi intervention.   
The next category is “financial education desired." Four variables from this category feature 
in our model.  One of these makes the choice of Mzansi more likely, while the other three act 
in the opposite direction. First of all, seeking no further financial education makes one more 
likely to choose Mzansi. What this reveals is the following: Mzansi holders have reached a 
level of financial literacy, but do not strive to move further, they are happy where they are. 
The other three selected variables in this category make a decision to choose Mzansi less 
likely. This means that in general looking for further financial education expresses desire and 
aspirations to move further up the financial access ladder.  This interpretation is reinforced by 
the type of these three variables. The first of these variables relates to the effective use of 
technology (hence moving into other financial access channels such as e.g. mobile banking). 
The other variable relates to working out credit repayments. This could show a desire to 
overcome debt, but also maybe planning for minor investments. The last variable in this 
category relates to selecting investment products, which undoubtedly accounts for aspirations 
far beyond the basic access to financial services offered by the Mzansi intervention. What is 
also highly informative is that what variables (from this category) are not selected. In 
particular, most of these refer to basic financial literacy such as e.g. understanding interest 
rates. As discussed above such variables cannot be effectively discriminate between Mzansi 
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holders and individuals with no financial access. The financial aspirations can distinguish 
Mzansi from above, but not from below, and most of these omitted variables are essentially 
measuring such low level aspirations. Hence aspirations are important determinants of the 
choice of the Mzansi intervention from an individual point of view, since it is much more 
important who they want to be, rather than who they actually are. 
The next two categories are the financial perceptions. Only one variable from the second grid 
is retained in the final model. Remembering that the second grid measure stated, as opposed 
to acted upon perceptions (i.e. elicitated from their actual behaviour) in the first grid, this may 
simply reflect an elicitation problem. The unreliability of stated as opposed to revealed 
preferences is not by any means a novel fact. The variable from grid 2 (i.e. stated 
perceptions) refers to that agreeing with the statement that young people know more about 
money than older ones makes the choice of Mzansi more likely.  This finding is all but 
logical given that recent (and no so recent) innovations in banking have been linked to 
introduction of new technologies such as e-banking, (mobile) phone banking, ATMs and 
banking agents networks. Since older people find it more difficult to deal with technical 
innovations, particularly in more traditional societies, such as assertion is to be expected. 
The revealed perceptions show an interesting picture. There are six selected variables from 
this category. This shows that on one hand revealed perceptions are related to (i.e. correlated 
to) other determinants of behaviour, something that lies at the core of our conceptual model. 
This correlation forces the estimation algorithm to retain more variables from this category. 
Moreover, the inclusion of so many variables from this particular category reveals that the 
perceptions and attitudes are very important in defining the decision to choose a given 
financial service (in this case Mzansi). The most influential (i.e. the one with the largest 
coefficient) of these variables states that Mzansi holders generally agree with the statement 
(i.e. individuals agreeing with this statement are more likely to choose Mzansi) that money is 
to be withdrawn as soon as possible. This is consistent with the known fact that many Mzansi 
accounts are used mainly for receiving payments. This attitude to using Mzansi mainly as a 
vehicle for receiving money is very important in the structure of perceptions. Note, however, 
that although its relative effect is about twice the effect of the next in terms of importance 
variable in this category, it is not as dominant as one could have expected. Bearing in mind 
that five more variables in this category with broadly similar in terms of magnitude effects, 
this dominance is somewhat reduced. One could speculate that a motivation to withdraw 
money as soon as possible could be a sign of liquidity constraints, that may be somewhat 
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alleviated if incomes were to improve. Such a conjecture, however, can only be properly 
tested in a dynamic setting, which the cross-sectional dataset we use here does not allow us to 
do. The other variables in this category, however, tell a rather interesting story. Two of these 
reveal a preference towards saving (‘you try to save regularly’ and ‘you go without basic 
things so that you can save’). Furthermore using informal channels for saving (using friends 
or family for safe-keeping money) reduces participation in Mzansi. Putting these together 
reveals a positive attitude for saving and incorporation into the formal financial services 
channels.  This preference towards saving is well defined in that putting together all the three 
effects above is commeasurable with the motivation for simply receiving payments. The next 
variable reveals a small debt aversion effect. One would need to put the latter in the wider 
context. Given the general debt awareness and the actual phrasing of the statement: “If you 
don’t have enough money to pay all your debts, you pay one debt one month and the next 
month you pay another debt”, the small coefficients reflect more actual inability to realise 
debt reduction strategy, rather than lack of desire to do so. This means that debt is seen as a 
serious problem among Mzansi account holders. Together with the possible liquidity 
constraints, this could be a symptom of a demand-side financial depression, possibly caused 
by the long-term supply-side driven exclusion from financial services. Therefore, the success 
of the Mzansi intervention may depend crucially on the general economic situation and 
poverty alleviation measures that reduce the indebtedness of the present and future 
customers. This suggests that not everything is doom and gloom with Mzansi. It provides a 
hint that it could, in principle, become sustainable for the banks from financial point of view. 
Note however, that this would only be possible if these preferences become realised, i.e. if a 
sufficient share of the Mzansi population can afford to save and reduce indebtedness, which 
in turn depends on a number of other factors such as e.g. economic growth, employment 
opportunities etc. Furthermore, the relatively small in magnitude coefficients suggest that 
these offshoots of possible future financial sustainability are rather fragile and could be 
shadowed by the present climate of financial austerity.  Note that savings accumulation is one 
of the ways to overcome type 2 credit rationing. Hence savings inclination could also indicate 
the presence of rationed demand. If this is the case, their behaviour is tuned to overcome 
credit rationing constraints. We can therefore assume that the segment of the population 
exhibiting such characteristics is long-term sustainable and potentially growth generating. 
This is an important result that deserves further investigation.  
This is a postprint of a research article. The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is published in 
Review of Development finance, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2015.04.001 
The last variable may appear slightly counterintuitive. It refers to the fact that having a will 
makes one less likely to opt into Mzansi. What is counterintuitive is not the effect itself, 
which is rather logical, but the actual inclusion of this variable. This is a variable that 
suggests a higher level of financial planning, which logically viewed would be characteristics 
of individuals with a better level of financial access. Hence this variable distinguishes Mzansi 
‘from above’.  
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Conclusions 
This paper investigated the determinants of demand for financial services with regard to the 
pre-entry Mzansi account intervention in South Africa. On its own and on average, taking 
into account the relative prominence of the latent motivations and attitudes that define its 
uptake, Mzansi does not look promising from both banks’ point of view and with regard to 
freeing a previously unrealised demand for financial services.  However, such conclusions 
should not be surprising since it is a pre-entry account. Our results hint for possible demand-
side rationing, due to long term exclusion from financial services. The elimination of supply-
side driven exclusion from finance via Mzansi can therefore free such latent demand that 
cannot manifest itself in a cross-sectional data setting. One need to take into account that it is 
unreasonable to expect that all Mzansi account holders will be the prime target for banks. The 
relative importance of the model coefficients, however, suggests that such sustainability 
segments exist.  
Financial education brings customers into Mzansi. We find no evidence that increasing the 
level of financial education (literacy) takes them further up to the financial access ladder.  
However, aspirations (which also can be translated in terms of financial educations) do move 
individuals up. It is reasonable to assume that providing (further) financial education can 
develop  and foster such aspirations and move household up to the financial access ladder 
(and probably out of poverty). We find that Mzansi holders, on the one hand, view the 
account, mainly as a vehicle for receiving payments, but on the other hand, are motivated to 
save. However, the real potential of Mzansi account lies in enabling customers to moving up 
in the financial access ladder.  
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Table 1. Estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Understanding of financial terms - Bad debt 0.147 
Understanding of financial terms - Garnishee order or emolument order 0.118 
Targets for financial advice - Independent broker 1.006 
Targets for financial advice - A financial advisor other than an independent 
broker (e.g. tax consultant, auditor) 0.514 
Financial education desired - How to make effective use of technology, such as 
cellphones or ATMs, to better manage your finances -0.402 
Financial education desired - How to work out how much credit you can 
afford/pay back on -0.305 
Financial education desired - How to select the best investment products -0.109 
Financial education desired - None 0.511 
Financial perceptions grid 1 - You try to save regularly 0.129 
Financial perceptions grid 1 - As soon as money is deposited into your account 
you withdraw it 0.473 
Financial perceptions grid 1 - You go without basic things so that you can save 0.2373 
Financial perceptions grid 1 - You hand over some or all of your money to a 
friend or family member for safekeeping or to guard it -0.205 
Financial perceptions grid 1 - If you don’t have enough money to pay all your 
debts, you pay one debt one month and the next month you pay another debt 0.168 
Financial perceptions grid 1 - You have a will or last testament -0.170 
Financial perceptions grid 2 - When it comes to money, young people know 
more than older people 0.127 
 
 
